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Historical analysis is increasingly used as a tool in the study of present-day populism in Europe. 
The past is often explored as a source of analogies through which to examine today’s populism, 
and at other times in search of causal mechanisms to explain the current populist wave. In this 
paper we focus on a third kind of link between populism and the past, namely the ways populist 
movements and leaders use and abuse history and historical memory in their quest for mass 
support. This angle on the populism/history nexus can yield deep insight into the ideological 
make-up of these movements and their voters, and populism’s discursive dynamics and strategies. 
Focusing on contemporary right-wing populism and its approach to the dark past of European 
countries, the paper conducts an exploratory analysis that posits three ways in which the past 
is (ab)used by populists: (a) the positive reassessment of dark history; (b) the recourse to fake 
history; (c) the evocation and subsequent denial of links with the dark past. In examining each, 
we use examples taken from the cases of Italy and The Netherlands to check the plausibility of 
our categories across different national cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Populism, particularly in its right-wing version, is one 
of the most interesting, and arguably the most wor-
rying contemporary developments in the politics of 
European and other Western democracies. The rise of 
populism has been mirrored by a large, growing body 
of scholarship examining its origins, characteristics, 
trajectories and effects in various national contexts 
(e.g. Canovan, 1981, 2005; Taggart, 2000; Mény and 
Surel 2002; Mudde 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell 
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2008; Wodak 2015; Moffitt 2016; Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017; Müller 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin 
2018). 
A small but growing part of the work on Europe’s 
right-wing populism looks at the latter’s connections 
with history, and more generally the past. For example, 
comparisons between contemporary populism and a 
number of historical experiences — above all inter-war 
Fascism — are often made to identify analogies and 
differences in the nature and broader political context 
leading to either phenomenon (e.g. McDougall 2016; 
Eatwell 2017; Finchelstein 2017; 2018). Other scholars 
examine history “genealogically,” that is trying to 
trace causal links between past events and critical 
junctures and the emergence and success of today’s 
populist movements, operating through institutional 
as well as cultural/ideological mechanisms (e.g. Tag-
gart 2000; Fieschi 2004; Mammone 2009; Caramani 
and Manucci 2019).
A third way in which right-wing populism and the 
past can be linked is by looking at the way populists 
use history in their language, references and symbols 
as a way to win and consolidate popular support. A 
less systematically analysed aspect of the populism/
history nexus is populists’ use (and abuse) of the past. 
This not only sheds much light on the ideological 
and cultural make-up of these political movements 
but also tells us a lot about their voters. 
Broadly speaking, one can split the politically exploit-
able past into two categories: the good, or “noble” past, 
and the bad or “dark” past. The former comprises all 
those events, historical stages or individual characters 
that are seen in a mostly positive light within a coun-
try’s cultural mainstream, and that help articulate a 
nation’s self-image and a national imaginary. Gilded 
stories of national independence, liberation or unifica-
tion the celebration of national heroes, war victories, 
and the like belong to the noble past. The “dark” past, 
conversely, includes parts of (national) history that 
are commonly viewed negatively and as a source of 
national shame. Fascism, collaboration with it, and 
war, as well as colonial and imperial atrocities occupy 
a central place in Europe’s dark past. Yet, depending 
on the countries concerned, other episodes and stages 
(for instance, anti-Semitism, racism, genocide, civil 
war, dictatorship, and so forth) may carry equal weight.
While right-wing populism (ab)uses both pasts, we 
contend that its link with the dark past is especially 
worth examining. The largely uncontroversial (at least 
nationally) nature of the noble past yields two results. 
The first is that populists have to compete with other 
parties in exploiting history for political purposes. The 
second is that such exploitation is usually a kind of 
‘appropriation race’ to use the good bits, with all the 
parties and movements (including populists) each try-
ing to pass themselves off as the true heirs of a given 
historical stage, figure, and so on.1 The dark past is an 
altogether different game that right-wing populism 
mainly plays on its own. Yet populism’s dalliance 
with the dark past poses several challenges in using it 
for political ends. Thus looking at the way populists 
deal with these challenges not only helps trace the 
contours of their ideational outlook but also yields a 
better understanding of the discursive and rhetorical 
tools, expedients and manipulation these movements 
use in their quest for (mainstream) political support. 
This paper looks at three ways a sector of right-wing 
populism uses and abuses the dark past. They are: (a) 
the positive reassessment of dark history; (b) the re-
course to fake history; (c) the evocation and subsequent 
denial of connections with the dark past. The goal is 
not so much to test an exhaustive typology but rather 
(and more modestly) to start putting some order to 
this topic and smooth the path for more systematic 
studies later on. This exploratory analysis will use the 
cases of Italy and The Netherlands to illustrate the 
ways in which right-wing populists exploit the dark 
past. This selection of cases is, broadly speaking, in 
 1 Consider, for instance, repeated attempts by Italy’s Silvio 
Berlusconi — in many ways a founding father of contemporary 
right-wing populism in Europe — to acquire political legitimacy 
and respectability by portraying himself and his Forza Italia 
party as carrying the legacy of Alcide De Gasperi, a founder of 
both the Italian Christian Democratic party and the country’s 
post-WWII republic (La Repubblica 2003).
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line with a “most different” comparative research 
design. While Italy and The Netherlands are quite 
different in terms of political history, political culture, 
national imaginaries and the mobilisation of collec-
tive historical memory, both countries have seen the 
upsurge of tainted historical tropes, metaphors and 
references in right-wing populist discourse, as will 
become clear below. By choosing two different political 
and cultural contexts within which right-wing popu-
lists have employed similar discursive, rhetorical and 
narrative strategies, we hope to show the plausibility 
of our preliminary classification of cases.
In the next three sections of the paper, we expound 
the three above-mentioned modes of populist (ab)
use of the past. For each of them we present, first, a 
general description, and then illustrations from Italy 
and The Netherlands. In the fifth and final section we 
conclude by recapping our argument and reflecting 
on the implications of our findings for future work 
on the theme of populism and the past. 
REASSESSING THE DARK PAST 
The most straightforward way in which right-wing 
populists use and manipulate history is simply by put-
ting the dark past in a positive light. This, we submit, 
is done mainly through three, partly overlapping, dis-
cursive strategies. The first is by simply reinterpreting 
certain controversial historical events, junctures, or 
characters more positively. Here, those aspects, angles 
and nuances that put them in a better light are the 
ones that get highlighted. The second is by shifting 
and keeping the narrative focus on some (inevitably) 
positive aspects of an overall negative historical stage 
or experience. The third is by minimising the gravity 
of and/or national responsibility for those bits of the 
dark past that are harder to downplay, presenting 
them as mistakes, the work of traitors, actions taken 
under duress, and so forth.
Taken together, these three ways of reassessing history 
amount to an ambitious endeavour by populists to 
recast bits of the dark past as noble. The goal, in do-
ing so, is twofold: on the one hand, populists aim to 
mobilise and embolden a certain part of the electorate 
on the far right of the political spectrum (especially 
if these voters are still sitting on the fence). On the 
other hand, and perhaps even more ambitiously, 
populists want to push the dark past into the cultural 
mainstream so that they can court more moderate 
parts of the electorate by reassuring them that is safe 
to vote for right-wing parties. 
In Italy, reassessment of the dark past mainly covers 
the Fascist period. Such re-evaluation is also made by 
the left end of the political spectrum, especially as left-
wing parties shift to the centre (e.g. Mammone 2006; 
La Stampa 2018; Curridori 2018). Yet unsurprisingly, 
it is among right-wing parties that such revisionism 
of Il ventennio [the twenty years of Fascist rule] is most 
common. Such attempts usually come as variations 
on the common theme of “Mussolini also did good 
things,” gilding the dictatorship’s achievements in 
an effort to rehabilitate the country’s Fascist past. 
This excerpt from Michaela Biancofiore (in Ruccia 
2013), a prominent member of Forza Italia (the party 
founded by Silvio Berlusconi), expresses this kind of 
revisionism well.
Mussolini did many positive things, [especially] 
in the area of infrastructure, and in re-launching 
Italy. ... He then took the country to war on 
Hitler’s side and that was a mistake. But take 
Bolzano … [when] Fascism arrived here, there 
were still open-air sewers… sewer networks 
in Italy, not just in Alto Adige, were built by 
Mussolini. Motorways were built by Mussolini. 
In Bolzano, the whole area where the hospital 
now stands, that vast piece of land would not 
exist today … because back then there was a 
swamp, which [the Fascist government] drained 
exactly as it did with The Pontine Marshes … 
where they created jobs for many peasants from 
Veneto, who then settled there. … These things 
cannot be forgotten. … It is true that [Mussolini] 
was a dictator but dictators sometimes leave 
behind great works. … Like all great men — and 
Mussolini was a great man of history — it was 
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not so much him but rather his inner circle ... 
who perpetrated violence in his name.2 
The above quotation contains many of the tropes of 
this kind of reinterpretation, including the notion 
that Benito Mussolini was a victim of his entourage. 
Roberta Lombardi, one of the leaders of the Five Star 
Movement, proposed a very similar depiction of 
“Good Fascism” in a controversial blog post on the 
topic (in Sofia 2013): “before it degenerated, [Fascism] 
had a national sense of community taken fully from 
Socialism, and great respect for the State and for 
family.” Here, it is little wonder that Matteo Salvini’s 
far right Lega has come up with the most extreme 
reassessments. In an interview, Mario Borghezio — 
a notorious party firebrand — (in Davi 2015) took 
historical reassessment beyond Italy’s borders, to 
propose a positive reinterpretation of the Nazi regime:
If there is a character [of that period] that I very 
much like, it is Walther Darré (who was what we 
would today call Minister for the Environment). 
It was he who introduced environmentalism in 
politics. … not to mention [Nazi advances in] 
other areas such as scientific and cancer research. 
… There has yet to be a historiographic school 
able to better interpret that period. ... Of course, 
the Holocaust page remains a blot on the record.
In contrast to Italy’s associations with Fascist move-
ments or actors, such references have remained a 
taboo in the Dutch political landscape up until the 
present day, apart from a marginal neo-Nazi fringe. 
References to the Dutch inter-war National Socialist 
movement (Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging) are used 
sparsely, though hyperbolically by the left and the 
right alike to accuse (political) opponents of (high) 
treason, Fascism or racism. As such, it is not inter-war 
authoritarianism or Fascism that shape right-wing 
populist’s discursive strategies on the dark past. Rather, 
the colonial past has been (mis)used to whitewash 
one of the blackest pages in Dutch history. Whereas 
the public and intellectual discourse on the history of 
slavery and enslavement, imperialism, and colonial 
 2 This and all subsequent translations from Italian and Dutch 
are by the authors of the article. 
violence (particularly the post-war colonial conflict 
in Indonesia) has increasingly accepted the nation’s 
collective guilt, right-wing populist or ‘nativist’ lead-
ers tend to challenge this interpretation. Worryingly, 
centrist politicians have also begun tapping into this 
revisionism, thus confirming Ruth Wodak’s (2015) 
observation of right-wing populist topoi becoming 
mainstream in political discourse. 
Ever since the Christian-Democratic Prime Minister 
Jan Peter Balkenende infamously proposed the invo-
cation of the “Dutch East India Company mentality” 
in 2006, which was heavily criticised by the media 
and parliament, references to the colonial past in 
political discourse have been contrite. Against the 
backdrop of the disclosure of new historical revela-
tions of Dutch imperial misbehaviour and atrocities, 
there is a broad scholarly and public consensus on 
Dutch wrong-doings overseas.
Recently, statues of (in)famous captains and traders 
of the Dutch East India Company, as well as streets, 
squares and buildings named after them, became 
contested as part of the globally emerging discus-
sion about “decolonising” society and public spaces. 
In this context, right-wing populists and nativists 
started deploying an apologetic counter-narrative on 
a “noble” or even nostalgic colonial past. 
When a bust of a 17th century aristocratic slave-trader 
was removed from a public building, the right-wing 
national-populist Martin Bosma (member of Geert Wil-
ders Freedom Party, PVV) saw it as “part of an endless 
‘politically correct’ iconoclasm threatening our history 
and our culture” (in Elsevier 2018). Similarly, Thierry 
Baudet, the leader of the conservative-nationalist Forum 
voor Democratie, nostalgically argued that “once, the 
whole world belonged to us” after which he added 
that the “last bit of grandeur” should not be given 
up, referring to the overseas Dutch territories in The 
Antilles (in Trouw 2017). On other occasions, Baudet 
and his party used depictions of (alleged) East India 
Company ships and at one point he had an interview 
on a replica vessel because the East India Company 
“was a splendid enterprise and an adventure like no 
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other” (Forum 2017). Many similar examples may 
be mentioned here, including statements made by 
local right-wing populists, that challenge the narra-
tive of colonial guilt and reiterate 19th century-style 
celebrations of a glorious imperial past shaped by the 
splendid virtues of the Dutch. 
As such, the piecemeal reassessment of the Dutch 
colonial past in terms of being complicit in the slave 
trade, enslavement, genocidal violence, and the op-
pression of peoples, has been challenged by the re-
visionists. This revisionism has three strands: (1) 
Apologism (“good things came out of colonialism”); 
(2) Nativism (some critics see it as “whitewashing” 
“black” history); (3) Nostalgia (“we should be proud 
of our colonial achievements”). Such responses are 
largely represented by right-wing populists in Dutch 
political and public discourse. National virtues and 
ideals are projected on a mythical past and the “dark 
side” of that history is downplayed or simply ignored. 
USING FAKE HISTORY 
As well as re-assessing historical stages, facts and char-
acters, populists can simply make up history, inventing 
events, embellishing other cases, using wrong data, 
invoking imaginary pictures of the past and so forth. 
They engage in what Furedi (2018, 87) has termed the 
manipulation of memory “in order to manufacture 
a glorious golden age and a heroic national past”. 
We call these strategies “fake history” to highlight 
their connection with the now popular notions of 
“fake news” or “post-truth” claims, which populists 
are particularly apt to resort to in mobilising their 
electorate. Making up historical facts and data is a 
slightly more sophisticated version of the same game. 
This second kind of abuse of history is similar to and 
sometimes overlaps the first. In a way, re-assessing cer-
tain historical events, stages or characters is an exercise 
in falsifying history. The historian Andrea Mammone 
(2006) captures the overlap between these two kinds 
of distortion quite well with the notion of “artificial 
history”. To the largely undisputed historical narratives 
and interpretations of the past, “fake history” adds 
something new to colloquial understandings of the 
dark past. It presents inaccurate, false counter-evidence 
to mitigate a given dark past. It might, subsequently, 
disclose an alternative “darker” past of “others”. These 
might involve circulating exaggerated or made-up 
facts, data or events but may also imply the depiction 
of an imagined “fact-free” past that fits the populist 
allegory of the people’s “true history”.
While populists’ goals in using fake history are largely 
similar to those behind historical reassessment, fake 
history seems less likely than the previous case to 
show top-down dynamics. While some fake history 
is fostered by political leaders, the latter need to tread 
carefully lest they be publicly debunked. Therefore, 
this kind of abuse of history mainly spreads sideways 
rather than trickling down from the top. Needless to 
say, social media are a particularly conducive channel 
for spreading such lies (for instance through histori-
cal memes). 
The fabrication of parts of Fascist history is a prolific 
field in Italy’s political discourse. A particularly recur-
rent theme, closely connected to the re-assessment of 
Mussolini’s regime, is the attribution to the latter of 
achievements that in fact belong to other periods of 
history. A common preconception is that the Fascist 
regime set up the first countrywide pension system 
and the corresponding pension fund, INPS (Istituto 
nazionale della previdenza sociale). This piece of fake 
history — the forerunner of the INPS was founded 
in 1898 — has gained wide currency in recent years 
among right-wing populists in their efforts to show 
how the oft-slated Fascist regime was more compassion-
ate than today’s mainstream, technocratic governments 
and their obsession with fiscal discipline. The League 
leader Matteo Salvini (in Mollica 2018) is a frequent 
proponent of this piece of fake history: “Many good 
things were done during the Fascist period, for instance 
the introduction of the pension system”. Echoing 
Salvini, Roberta Lombardi (in Globalist 2018) added 
“When it comes to Fascism, there is a principle [i.e. 
anti-Fascism] in our Constitution to which I wholly 
adhere. But if I think about the INPS, I believe that it 
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was a victory for civilisation”.
Instead of attributing someone else’s achievements 
to the Fascist regime, another branch of fake history 
minimises or even denies the dictatorship’s crimes, 
violence and the destruction it wrought at home and 
abroad. In this category we find every conceivable 
variation on the theme of “Good Italian, Bad German” 
which blames all of Italy’s worst acts during WWII to 
the “evil influence” of Nazi Germany (e.g. Mammone 
2006; Morgan 2009; Focardi 2013). Once again, while 
this sort of narrative is also used beyond the right 
of the political spectrum, it is right-wing populist 
movements that find it especially useful politically. 
Another case of this kind of fake history is shown 
by Silvio Berlusconi’s extravagant claim (in Hooper 
2003) that “Mussolini never killed anyone … [he] sent 
people on holiday”, referring to the regime’s practice 
of confining political enemies in remote places, such 
as islands, to neutralise them politically by cutting 
their links with the rest of society. 
Last but not least, some fake history stresses Italy and 
Italians as victims of foreigners as an indirect way 
of softening criticism of the Fascist regime. A case 
in point is that of the “Foibe Massacres” of Italians 
living in Dalmatia and Venezia Giulia by Yugoslav 
partisan, a historical event far from being fake but for 
which the number of victims is regularly inflated by 
right-wing populists well beyond the proven figures. 
Interestingly, this is also a case where photos have been 
shamelessly used to whip up hate. For instance, there 
is the now infamous picture showing an allegedly 
Yugoslav group of soldiers preparing to execute five 
unarmed civilians. This is used over and over again by 
right-wingers (e.g. by former Minister and President of 
the Lazio region, Francesco Storace, in Lonigro 2016) 
to demonstrate the cruelty of Communist partisans 
against harmless Italians. Experts have proven that 
the picture shows the exact opposite — namely Ital-
ian soldiers (recognisable by their uniforms) about to 
execute some Slovenian civilians during the Fascist 
occupation of Slovenia in WWII. 
In The Netherlands, wartime experiences of National 
Socialism, the Holocaust and collaboration with the 
Nazi occupiers still translate into a dichotomous moral 
scheme of “good” and “evil” in public discourse and 
attempts to re-write the story are avoided (at least 
publicly). Consequently, World War II-related matters 
are usually shunned by right-wing populists in their 
invention of fake histories. As with the reassessment 
of a dark national past, the colonial and imperial 
Holland of yore is used to spin fake histories or to 
present fact-free historical illustrations. Clearly tying 
in with the apologetic counter-narrative of a noble 
Dutch imperial past, right-wing populists have spo-
ken about “Dutch victimhood” in colonial history. 
Although this is a subtler kind of manipulation than 
fake histories, in this discursive strategy Dutch right-
wing populists make highly dubious historical claims 
peppered with alleged ‘facts’ that always turn out to 
lack clear empirical support and transparent refer-
ences. One recurring trope is the alleged enslavement 
of Dutch (white) people by Muslim Arabs.
Starting as a loose reference to a polemic article in 
the Jewish World Review by the American economist 
Thomas Sowell (2010), the idea that more Europe-
ans were enslaved by Muslims in North Africa than 
Africans enslaved in the United States was taken up 
by anti-Islam politicians. In The Netherlands, Mar-
tin Bosma echoed Sowell’s claim in a provocative 
book, written as an indictment of the “left-wing”, 
cosmopolitan vested interests in Dutch and Euro-
pean politics and society. Bosma argues that public 
understanding of the Dutch national past amounts 
to “historical photo-shopping” by overlooking “cen-
turies of Islamic dominion” to which Dutchmen and 
other Europeans were “subjected” (Bosma 2010). As 
Sowell’s claim went viral again in 2016, a Dutch qual-
ity newspaper decided to fact-check it (NRC 2016). 
Initially, the NRC confirmed Sowell’s claims. Thierry 
Baudet re-tweeted the fact-check a year later in a new 
public controversy, this time over the practice of 
black-facing during the arrival of Sinterklaas, a Dutch 
Christmas festivity with strong colonialist and racist 
connotations. As public intellectuals and historians 
started pointing to historical inaccuracies and false 
evidence in NRC’s fact check, the newspaper rectified 
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its statement and concluded that Sowell’s claim was 
false and unsustainable. Baudet and his party, however, 
kept alluding to the “Dutch slaves” trope at rallies. 
This is what Fascism and populism expert Federico 
Finchelstein (2019) referred to as the populists’ use of 
“deliberate falsehood as a weapon against the truth” 
when it comes to history. 
Another discursive strategy frequently employed by 
right-wing populists, particularly by Geert Wilders 
and his Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid), is 
the invocation of a historically inaccurate national 
image. This false image is shaped by vague historical 
iconography of a homogenous, self-governing Dutch 
nation. In early November 2017, Wilders (in the 
Tweede Kamer [Lower House, Dutch Parliament] 2017) 
delivered an impassioned speech in parliament on 
such an imaginary Dutch past, on which core values of 
self-determination, national sovereignty and cultural 
homogeneity were projected:
Our country was once the most beautiful 
country in the world, with its own borders, its 
own culture. We spent our money on our own 
people. We had decent health care for our elders 
... We had a strong, self-willed, and above all a 
proud country ... Nobody was able to break us. 
We were sovereign. We took our own decisions. 
We were masters of our own country and our own 
borders ... The Netherlands was The Netherlands. 
How different ... is it today! Our country is up 
for grabs. Our interests have been harmed. Many 
Dutchmen have become aliens in their own 
nation ... Our country, our home, the miracle 
that our ancestors have built with blood, sweat 
and tears, is being given away. 
When the progressive liberal MP Alexander Pechtold 
asked Wilders which period he was actually referring 
to, Wilders replied: “Before 1850, approximately”. This 
sort of anachronistic blending of chauvinist welfarism, 
national sovereignty and ethno-cultural unity has 
served repeatedly, both visually and discursively, as 
a mythical national imaginary — a “fake” national 
past that depicts the people’s historical “heartland” 
and forms part of Wilder’s political discourse (Taggart 
2000). Though not directly linked to countering a dark 
national past, this mythical national imaginary clearly 
challenges the empirically sustained “dark” Dutch past 
that has risen to prominence in intellectual and public 
discourse. In his study on the Freedom Party, Koen 
Vossen (2017, 41) argues that such narratives of the 
alleged historicity of ‘the people’ fit the construction 
of a national culture that is a “recognisable, indivisible 
phenomenon that goes back centuries” and should 
serve as the bedrock of “national pride”.
EVOKING AND THEN DENYING CONNECTIONS TO THE 
DARK PAST
Populists also use references to the dark past in a third, 
subtler way by distancing themselves from and denying 
connections between themselves and negative histori-
cal cases, periods or characters. This is a last resort, so 
to speak, which populists adopt on those aspects of 
the dark past that are broadly deemed unacceptable 
and that are unlikely to be down-played or falsified. 
Racism in general or anti-Semitism in particular are 
examples of these aspects.
What is interesting in such denials is that they very 
often come after right-wing populists have actually 
done or said something that evokes, in the audience’s 
minds, the very connection that is later denied. Such 
a response is not altogether surprising. The two parts, 
hinting and denial, often go hand in hand in what 
looks like a perverse “bait and switch” move, in which 
the populist ‘kills two birds with one stone’: on the 
one hand, he/she gains credit in the eyes of extreme 
sections of the electorate through the use of certain 
statements, symbols, or some subtler forms of “dog 
whistling” (Wodak 2015). On the other hand, through 
denial they reassure the more moderate voters and 
political actors about their democratic credentials. 
This apparently inconsistent but fully intentional dual 
message is an established communicative feature of 
right-wing movements, as documented for instance by 
Cheles (2010) in connection with Italy’s post-Fascist 
party Alleanza Nazionale.
112 — Stefan CouperuS - pier DomeniCo tortolaDEBATS · Annual Review, 4 · 2019
As shown above, Italian right-wing populists often 
woo part of the population by putting a gloss on the 
country’s Fascist past. At times the appeal is brutal 
and without excuses. However, here we are talking 
of a softer approach that eschews plain-speaking and 
instead draws on symbols, buzzwords, gestures, and 
the like. For example, Matteo Salvini would never 
openly present himself as a Fascist sympathiser. Yet 
he has been photographed both in the company of 
the leadership of Casapound — a social movement 
openly inspired by the Fascist ideology — and wear-
ing clothes from a brand connected to it. This makes 
one wonder where his sympathies lie.
Salvini’s most recent invocation of Fascism, however, 
relates to the use, via social media, of a number of 
buzzwords and quotes commonly associated with 
Il ventennio [the 20-year period of Fascist rule]. In a 
response to his critics tweeted on the 29th of July 
2018 (the same day as Mussolini’s birthday), Salvini 
wrote “many enemies, much honour” (tanti nemici, 
tanto onore), which is only a slight variation on the 
slogan molti nemici, molto onore, famously attributed 
to the Duce (Il Messaggero 2018). Then there were 
two similar “incidents”, in which Salvini used Fascist 
quotations phrases within a few days of each other. 
In one, Salvini wrote on his Facebook page that “He 
who halts is lost” (chi si ferma è perduto) (Ruccia 2018). 
In another, as he commented on the European Com-
mission’s warnings about Italy’s 2019 budget, Salvini 
proudly stated “I don’t give a damn!” (Me ne frego!) 
(Adnkronos 2018). 
The Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) is by no 
means immune from such invocations. Beppe Grillo 
— the comedian who co-founded, and remains the 
charismatic leader of the Five Star Movement — for 
example once stated in the presence of some journal-
ists that he had nothing against a Casapound member 
joining his movement — a statement that many saw 
as an attempt to attract support from that side of the 
political spectrum (La Stampa 2013). Speaking of sym-
bols, Grillo often intersperses his shows with the call 
Italiani! shouted in the same manner as Mussolini used 
to, as he addressed crowds from his Palazzo Venezia 
balcony. Yet this effective comedic device could, once 
again, also be seen as an attempt to wink at a certain 
part of the electorate, while at the same time defusing 
the issue of Fascism by making fun of it. 
The latter observation is important because it takes 
us straight into Italian right-wing populists’ preferred 
strategy for denying any link or proximity to the 
country’s dark past. For instance, they claim that 
Fascism is a thing of the past and thus any attempt to 
link them to that ideology would not only be false but 
also meaningless. This strategy is especially important 
for the Five Star Movement, which has built much 
of its political narrative on its transcendence of the 
left and right labels. For instance, when asked about 
his father’s open adherence to the Fascist ideology, 
Alessandro Di Battista (in Sannino and Vecchio 2017), 
one of the Five Star leaders, responded that it is more 
important to be honest than anti-Fascist, and that 
“talking about Fascism in 2016 is like talking about 
The Guelphs and The Ghibellines.” [12th and 13th 
Century political factions in Mediaeval Italy]
Denying the possibility of a return of Fascism under 
a different guise is a recurrent way of denying 
embarrassing connections on the part of more openly 
right-wing populists. Both Salvini and Giorgia Meloni 
— the leader of Fratelli d'Italia [Brothers of Italy], a 
smaller right-wing party — used this approach when 
Luca Traini (the Lega’s former municipal candidate 
and a Nazi sympathiser) fired on a number of African 
immigrants in Macerata in February 2018. The racist 
nature of the attack and the use of political violence in 
the country was clear. Yet Salvini (in Il Fatto Quotidiano 
2018) commented that “This idea of a Fascist danger, 
of the return of Fascism, of a new wave of black 
shirts, is surreal to me, and it is used by a political 
faction that has shown its hollowness over the last 
six years”. Salvini’s words echoed those by Giorgia 
Meloni (in Globalist 2018):
Politicians should worry about those [foreign] 
terrorists based in Italy rather than continuing 
this surreal debate on the return of Fascism. What 
happened in Macerata is the deed of a violent 
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lunatic, period. If Mein Kampf was among his 
readings, that’s his business. It is not the return 
of Fascism.
In its formative stages, Geert Wilders’s Freedom Party 
(Partij voor de Vrijheid), founded in 2006, associated 
itself with symbols previously used by the Dutch 
National Socialist movement in the 1930s and 1940s. 
When the party presented its logo in 2008, historians 
were quick to point out its troubling resemblance. 
The seagull at the centre of the logo combined with 
the word “freedom” was very similar to a 1941 poster 
printed by the Dutch National Socialist movement 
and the logo of its youth league (Historisch Nieuws-
blad 2008). Geert Wilders responded furiously, by 
stating that he cannot “Take into account every bad 
organisation in the world that has used symbols” and 
that the comparison made between his party and the 
national socialists could only occur to someone with 
“a sick mind” (in Trouw 2008). In other statements, he 
distanced himself from any National Socialist inclina-
tion or endorsement arguing that the seagull was the 
idea of the advertising company he commissioned to 
design the party logo. Despite the obvious similarities, 
the Freedom Party kept the logo unchanged, though 
it has featured less frequently in its propaganda over 
the last few years.
A few years later, the Freedom Party again sported a 
symbol that was reminiscent of the Dutch National 
Socialists’ visual repertoire. In 2011, two MPs of the 
Freedom Party decorated their parliamentary office 
windows with the so-called ‘Prince’s Flag’ [Prinsenv-
lag], a horizontal tricolour of orange, white and blue. 
This particular flag was frequently used by the Dutch 
National Socialists in the 1930s and 1940s as an alter-
native to the official Dutch flag (red, white, blue) but 
has had a much longer history. The flag was first flown 
by Orangists during the Dutch revolt against Spanish 
domination (1568-1648) and also inspired the South 
African government to design the flag that became 
associated with the apartheid regime (The Economist 
2015). During the last few decades, Dutch neo-Nazi 
and ultra-nationalist fringe movements have also 
adopted the flag in their iconography. As such, the flag 
has multi-layered meanings that allude to an opaque 
nexus of patriotism, racism and collaborationism. No 
official response was forthcoming from either Wilders 
or the two MPs involved but the flags were removed 
from the party offices as newspapers widely reported 
on their dark connotations.
That was not the end of the Prince’s Flag however. Dur-
ing a Freedom Party rally in The Hague in September 
2013, various versions of the tricolour were spotted 
in the audience, showing how Wilders’s supporters 
accepted it as a banner. In the same week, four MPs 
of the Freedom Party, among them Bosma, wore a 
Prince’s Flag pin on their lapel during the annual 
parliamentary general debate (NRC 2013). No formal 
public statement was issued by the party or Wilders, 
after questions arose about why the MP’s wore the pin 
that had clear ties with Dutch National Socialism. In 
the years that followed, Martin Bosma kept praising 
the flag as “The century-old symbol of our freedom” 
(Twitter 2015), also alluding to a “Great Dutch cultural 
union” between the Netherlands, Flanders and South 
Africa’s Afrikaner community (de Volkskrant 2014).
Of a different kind, but nevertheless similarly tapping 
into the no-go zone of the Dutch dark past of World 
War II and interwar Fascism, is a remark made by 
Thierry Baudet at an event in 2017 that was picked 
up on by radical right-wing blogs and, ultimately, by 
the mainstream media. Baudet observed a “self-hate 
... that we try to transcend ... by homeopathically 
diluting the Dutch population with all peoples of the 
world” (NPO Radio 1 2017). At first, Baudet rejected 
all racist accusations and refused to accept the remi-
niscence with pre-war racial purity metaphors and 
eugenics. In a national television show he stated 
that he “didn’t want to say anything about race ... It 
is about culture”, then adding that he would not use 
those words again seeing what sort of “bewildering” 
fuss it had created (NPO 1 2017). Nevertheless, coded, 
racialised variations have been included in his declara-
tions on alleged ‘national self-hate’ or on omvolking, 
or Grand Remplacement in the words of the French 
conspiracy theorist and writer Renaud Camus. Both 
terms are used to refer to a supposed elitist conspiracy 
whose purpose is to mix ethnic Dutchmen with other 
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‘peoples’, something to which both Wilders as well 
as Baudet have often referred (Oudenampsen 2019).
These examples show how right-wing populists and 
nativists use tainted tropes from a dark past by de-
nying any connection with that past and distancing 
themselves from it. However, they also refuse to accept 
that particular expressions, metaphors or symbols 
contain semantics that have an undeniable relation-
ship with a given dark national past. One could argue 
that complex or historicist reasoning about the past 
is consciously avoided in favour of the projection 
of a national ideal onto a mythical or nostalgic past 
which, allege the populists, has been obscured by 
the “politically correct” and “cosmopolitan” elites. 
UNDERSTANDING THE POPULIST MOBILISATION OF 
NATIONAL PASTS 
Mainstream politicians often articulate a “noble” past 
as part of Whiggish readings of ongoing progress and 
cultural advancement; (national) history moves for-
ward to ever greater freedom, prosperity, equality and 
inclusion. References to well-known “dark” historical 
episodes may also be part of this narrative, emphasising 
national resilience and the polity’s ability to return to 
the noble path of progress. The arrival of a substantial 
number of right-wing populist politicians in parlia-
ments and executive bodies in Europe has challenged 
this long-standing discursive, rhetorical and narrative 
strategy in mainstream politics. The past has become 
a new battlefield in which the populists challenge the 
hitherto accepted explanations of shameful periods of 
history and shamelessly attempt to downplay them 
or brighten them up. Exploring this nexus between 
populism and the dark past, we have proposed three 
analytically distinct strategies with which right-wing 
populists assess, address or allude to their nation’s dark 
historical episodes: (1) the positive reassessment of 
dark history; (2) the recourse to fake history; (3) the 
evocation and subsequent denial of connections with 
the dark past. All three strategies disclose how right-
wing populists read against the grain of established 
master narratives of a nation’s dark past. 
As our examples from Italy and the Netherlands have 
shown, these pasts revolve around recurring themes 
and tropes. In Italy these are draw from the era of 
Mussolini’s Fascist reign, whereas in the Netherlands 
the colonial past, both early modern as well as new 
imperialist, is the main — though not the only — 
breeding ground for right-wing populist politically 
motivated rewriting of the past. Regardless of the 
discursive strategy employed, the (ab)uses of dark 
pasts are geared towards the reclaiming of a “mythi-
cal” or “true” national past that has been blurred by 
hegemonic political correctness. The populists pre-
sent this fabricated past as a crucial reminder to the 
people in its struggle against: migration, globalism, 
Europe, corrupted elites and national “self-hate” 
— the forces that have thwarted national progress. 
Whether reassessing a dark episode, inventing histori-
cal facts or images, or engaging with a “forbidden” 
past, the strategies employed often culminate in 
direct or indirect allusions to an imagined past in 
which national virtues and self-determination went 
hand-in-hand with the ethno-cultural homogeneity 
of the country’s natives. At the end of the day, it is 
all about reclaiming the “true” history of the people. 
As populism scholar Cas Mudde(2016) puts it, people 
“let themselves be seduced by an imaginary public 
past that is mostly in line with their own imagined 
private past anyway”. This process may result from 
top-down public interventions (as with reassess-
ing a dark past) to more horizontal mobilisations 
of historical inaccuracies (as with fake history). A 
recent study analyses why Dutch and French voters 
opted for Wilders and Le Pen. It reveals this twofold 
dynamic, showing how fabricated pasts tap into 
vernacular national identity discourses that strike 
a chord among supporters of right-wing populism 
(Damhuis 2018).
This essay has only begun to address and order the 
political mobilisation of dark pasts by right-wing 
populists in public and political discourse. In line 
with a “most different case” strategy of comparison, 
it has explored a limited number of illustrative Italian 
and Dutch instances in which discursive strategies are 
applied to a contested past that strikes a chord with 
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the general public. Research on the radical right or 
right-wing populism has shown that these strategies 
have spread across Europe, other prominent examples, 
to name but a few, being the late radical right Austrian 
politician Jörg Haider, the French radical right Le Pen 
dynasty and the Hungarian prime minister Viktor 
Orbán. A comparative, systematic empirical inquiry 
into these and other examples is needed to test the 
preliminary typology of discursive strategies we have 
proposed. We believe such a research agenda will 
enhance our understanding of the ideational make-
up of right-wing populists and the way in which the 
past is mobilised politically in their discursive and 
rhetorical repertoires. 
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